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WOMEN'S LEGAL STRATEGIES IN CANADA EDITED BY RADHA




The twentieth anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 has presented an opportune moment to reflect on its impact in
securing for Canadians the liberal ideals of equality and justice enshrined
within it. Women's Legal Strategies, a feminist collection of articles edited
by Radha Jhappan, seizes part of this moment by extensively analyzing the
successes that the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) and
other women's groups have had with Charter intervention and litigation in
the 1980s and most of the 1990s.4 Its subject area in this regard is broad,
canvassing feminist involvement in leading cases and, to a lesser extent,
legislative reform with respect to issues such as abortion, domestic workers,
pornography, child care, and violence against women.
The goal of the collection is to provide answers to three questions:
First, should women persevere with the legal project despite its manifest perils? Second, by
what measures and from whose point of view have women's litigation strategies been
successful or unsuccessful? Third, what can we learn from the strategies pursued to date and
how might they be improved in future struggles?
5
The collection answers the first question with a resounding and, in
most cases, quick "yes." This brief attention to the first question makes
sense given the lead article by Sheila McIntyre addressing the traditional
skepticism of (white male) Left theorists about pursuing rights litigation to
engender social justice. In "Feminist Movement in Law: Beyond Privileged
and Privileging Theory," McIntyre ably, if somewhat severely, responds to
each prong of the Left critique with examples from feminist litigation to
argue for continued feminist engagement with law and rights litigation in
I[Women's Legal Strategies].
2 Assistant Professor, University of Victoria. B.A. (McGill), LL.B. (Toronto), LL.M (Columbia).
3Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), (1982), c.
11 [Charter].
4Due to this focus the title is somewhat broad. Jhappan is aware that Charter litigation does not
exhaust the legal strategies used by women in Canada and addresses the reasons for this focus at the
outset. Radha Jhappan, "Introduction: Feminist Adventures in Law" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 3 at 4
[Jhappan, "Introduction"].
5Ibid. at 3.
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particular.6 The rest of the authors focus their attention explicitly or
implicitly on the more difficult second and third questions through scrutiny
of previous, mostly Charter, litigation.' Understandably, these answers are
more tentative and context-specific.
The most definitive and consistent responses the collection gives to
the second question of measuring the success of litigation and other legal
strategies and the third question of how to improve upon this success are
to advocate for the continued democratization, or diversification, of the
women's movement in Canada. A constant theme is to document and
critique the gender essentialism' within the first years of feminist
engagement with the Charter and to support the increasing inclusiveness of
feminist legal advocacy perspectives consulted and presented. The volume
clearly imparts twin messages: women's legal strategies are successful when
they have been inclusive even if no legal case has been won and, even if a
particular litigation results in a legal loss, it may still have been a success for
feminists if it otherwise generated political momentum to disrupt
conventional gendered sensibilities.
The difficulty in providing a more expansive response to the second
and third questions is alluded to by several authors, but best articulated by
Sheilah Martin in "Abortion Litigation." 9 In her article, Martin usefully
notes the dilemmas that the indeterminacy of cause and effect analyses
pose to predicting or even analyzing in hindsight the impact of feminist
legal advocacy. The unknowability of how things would have been but for
the litigation, the difficulty in isolating legal change from other social forces
to determine its exact impact on public opinion, and the complexity in
6 Sheila McIntyre, "Feminist Movement in Law: Beyond Privileged and Privileging Theory" in
Jhappan, supra note 1, 42.
71bid.
8Gender essentialism refers to a set of theoretical practices that ascribe a unity to the signifier
"women" such that the experiences of all women, despite the differentiating factors of race, class,
sexuality, ethnicity, religion, and ability are reduced to issues of gender. It is a myopic view that
privileges the experiences of those women who are only adversely affected by gendered power relations
and equates them with those of women marginalized by several axes of power. "Intersectionality" is the
term used in feminist legal circles, drawing from the work of Kimberle Crenshaw, to signal a
commitment to analyses that recognize differences among women, affirm the multiplicity of women's
social locations, and accept that one's experience of gender will change according to one's race or class,
for example, and vice versa. The "intersectional" critique of gender essentialism is now well established
in feminist literature. See Kimberle Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics" (1989)
139 U. Chicago Legal F 41; Kimberle Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics and Violence Against Women of Color" (1991) 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1214. See also Elizabeth V.
Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems Of Exclusion In Feminist Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988).
9 Sheilah Martin, "Abortion Litigation" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 335.
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precisely defining what qualifies as success in litigation are all factors that
negate simplistic or universal theories of feminist litigation. 0 The resulting
speculative nature of assessing what will be good litigation to pursue for
women explains the lack of sustained discussion in the collection about how
to pragmatically and strategically pick and choose from among various
litigation options."
That the collection spends more time examining past litigation than
charting out new legal projects for feminists to adopt must also be
understood in its proper economic context, a point several authors
highlight. The ability to select whether to conduct or intervene in litigation
is a luxury feminist organizations have rarely enjoyed. Given the scarce
resources of many citizen groups in general and the prohibition against
active and extensive law reform activities that applies to groups seeking
charitable status under income tax laws, 2 much feminist legal advocacy has
been reactive rather than proactive. Accordingly, many of the contributions
analyze the development of a particular piece of litigation, taking care to
note the essentialist or anti-essentialist dimensions of the strategy, without
considering whether it was the right strategy to take at that time or
extrapolating from these cases to consider additional pragmatic criteria for
future initiatives. As the introduction deliberately sets the question of
devising better strategies for the future as one of the "guiding motifs of
enquiry,"' 3 the limited specific and pragmatic discussion on this issue may
also prove to be disappointing to some readers. This disappointment will
not be acute, however, as several of the essays do take up this question and
offer more global guidelines describing how to improve legal strategies.
In this regard, Jhappan presents a compelling argument for
replacing equality discourse, which has dominated feminist advocacy with
the attendant focus on section 15 of the Charter, with the discourse of
justice. In "The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice?"'4 Jhappan
describes equality as a "subset of [the] much larger normative principle" of
justice. 5 She argues that the ideas and aspirations associated with the
signifier "justice" reflect what lies at the core of feminist desires. It is
10 Ibid. at 340.
"Ibid.
12Susan D. Phillips, "Legal as Political Strategies in the Canadian Women's Movement: Who's
Speaking? Who's Listening" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 379 at 382.
Supra note 4 at 3.
14 Radha Jhappan, "The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice?" in Jhappan, supra note 1,
175.
15 Ibid. at 194.
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unnecessary, then, to pursue claims through the language of equality,
especially when section 15 jurisprudence mandates tortured and
problematic comparisons between one group and another. 6 Jhappan's
article closely engages with the second and third inquiries animating the
volume of identifying successful strategies for feminism and improving
upon them. She discusses several Charter cases and reframes their central
issues in the language of justice through a creative use of the "principles of
fundamental justice" discourse emanating from section 7 Charter
jurisprudence. Jhappan's proposal to imbue the "principles of fundamental
justice" with a grander, more politicized meaning than its current largely
procedural connotations suggests promising new theoretical directions for
rethinking current conceptual frameworks organizing feminist advocacy.
Lise Gotell's "Towards a Democratic Practice of Feminist
Litigation?: LEAF's Changing Approach to Charter Equality" offers a
thoughtful review of the feminist litigation strategies LEAF has used since
its inception in 1985 to argue, in a post-structural vein, for feminist
advocacy that emphasizes multiple interpretations. 17 By a close examination
of the factums LEAF has drafted in its interventions, Gotell charts a "series
of critical changes' 18 in LEAF's litigation strategies. She shows how LEAF has
moved away from gender essentialism, but still retains faith in
"foundationalism" or the Enlightenment-derived belief that experience
leads to uncontested truth. Continuing the trend of critiques of crude
versions of standpoint theory, 9 Gotell argues against a feminist litigation
strategy that asserts that its position is right or true because it is based on
women's experience. As Gotell notes, the effectiveness of this position is
that it collapses the different experiences women have as well as competing
versions of "truth" or the "correct" course of action. Gotell illustrates this
16 Ibid.
17 Lise Gotell, "Towards a Democratic Practice of Feminist Litigation?: LEAF's Changing
Approach to Charter Equality" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 135.
18 Ibid. at 164.
19 In general, standpoint theory asserts that only persons inhabiting certain (oppressed) social
locations are legitimate producers of knowledge about their social locations because they are the only
ones with lived experience of these social locations and so in a position to reveal the particularity of
purportedly universal claims. It is a theory that marries experience with truth such that (privileged)
persons who do not share the experience have no authority with which to claim to know or generate
knowledge about that particular experience. See Donna Haraway,
ModestWitness@SecondMillennium---FemaleMan© Meets Oncomouse ":feminism and technoscience
(London: Routledge, 1997) 302, n. 32, discussing Nancy Hartsock's seminal work in this area. The
debate over standpoint theory has been forcefully waged in legal circles in early Critical Race Theory
where scholars debated the special insights or "voice" a scholar of colour may have to better understand
racism vis-A-vis his or her white colleagues. See generally Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory: The
Cutting Edge (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
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tension well with the example of pornography, and the radical feminist
position LEAF unapologetically took in R. v. Butler ° despite considerable
dissension in feminist communities. Instead of perpetuating the
Enlightenment myth of justice being founded on truth, Gotell encourages
feminists to abandon the liberal project of establishing objective,
positivistic, and fixed foundations such as tests, categories, and boxes
through which to analyze inequality and discrimination. She favours
supplanting this traditional mode of legal analysis with a type appearing in
LEAF's recent factum in Vriend v. Alberta2 1 that "attempt[s] to reflect
complexity, contingency, and contending feminist positions.
'" 22
The collection also contains contributions that consider future
strategies after providing excellent surveys of feminist legal engagement
with the Charter and otherwise in discrete subject areas. "Negotiating the
Citizenship Divide: Foreign Domestic Worker Policy and Legal
Jurisprudence, 23 by Daiva Stasiulis and Abigail B. Bakan introduces
readers to the overwhelmingly feminized, racialized, and classed nature of
live-in domestic work under the current configurations of the capitalist
global economy. After thoroughly canvassing the exploitative aspects of the
current federal regime for domestic workers, the Live-in Caregiver
Program (LIP), including comparing the relative strengths of the LIP with its
predecessor and international counterparts, the authors review the few
litigated cases concerning the employment and immigration rights of
domestic workers. They also provide a contextualized discussion of possible
next steps in litigation in this area. Namely, rather than rely on privatized
victories that benefit only a few individuals, the authors challenge the racist
and sexist nature of the entire LIP under the Charter and advocate for better
immigration legislation as a whole.
In "Legal as Political Strategies in the Canadian Women's
Movement: Who's Speaking? Who's Listening?" Susan D. Phillips
considers whether litigation is a strategy worthy of feminist pursuit by
examining the impact of feminist legal advocacy in the 1990s in the areas
of violence against women and national child care.24 Phillips directly
engages with the collection's second organizing question by asking whether
"litigation in the cases discussed in this chapter [has] been successful and
20 [19921 1 S.C.R. 452 [Butler].
21 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
22 Gotell, supra note 17 at 165.
23 Davia Stasiulis & Abigail B. Bakan, "Negotiating the Citizenship Divide: Foreign Domestic
Worker Policy and Legal Jurisprudence" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 237.
24 Supra note 12.
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by what measures?, 25 She then offers three general criteria to evaluate the
success of litigation: "Did litigation help frame or reframe the issue in ways
that can be used politically by the movement? Did the case facilitate
political mobilization within the movement and among allies? Did the
judicial decision lead to changes in the law, policy, or process?, 26 Phillips'
attempt to initiate theory in this area underscores the fact that although it
is difficult to predict the feminist success of any piece of litigation, this does
not mean that litigation should be pursued without careful analysis. More
of these directives to challenge and assess future feminist litigation would
have been a valuable line of analysis for the collection to develop.
Still, those articles that restrict their focus to the collection's second
question of assessing past litigation are nevertheless engaging. Sheilah
Martin's article on abortion litigation, especially the Morgentaler27 decision,
is the type of close analysis of a particular topic that will benefit readers
conversant with feminist debates who are seeking more detailed analyses
of particular areas. After discussing the speculative nature of inquiries into
this area,28 Martin assesses different types of abortion-related litigation,
giving a firm sense of how issues have developed, the state of the current
law, as well as the feminist strengths and weaknesses at each turn.
Similarly informative is Diana Majury's "Women's (In)Equality
Before and After the Charter," a tight, if somewhat dated, analysis of
Charter equality jurisprudence under section 15 .29 The chapter gives section
15 non-experts a concise and engaging history of the Supreme Court's
shifting understandings of equality up to 2000. Majury is refreshingly frank
when she tells us that she refuses to provide a review of the jurisprudence
suggesting general themes and trends because the inchoate nature of the
cases precludes a coherent analysis. She highlights some of the intricate
issues regarding the meaning of equality that have arisen (for example, the
responsiveness to intersectionality and the naturalization of disability and
sex issues), but she "[does] not offer a bigger picture because at the
moment [she] cannot find one."30 Instead of feeling disoriented, however,
the reader feels informed.
One of the collection's most attractive features is the rigour with
25 Ibid. at 399.
26 Ibid.
27R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
28 See the discussion accompanying footnote 8.
29 Diana Majury, "Women's (In)Equality Before and After the Charter" in Jhappan, supra note
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which many authors apply an intersectional approach and otherwise
practise the anti-essentialism they discuss in their articles.31 Consider
Joanne St. Lewis' insights into the racialized dimensions of cases in which
LEAF has intervened. These cases are discussed earlier in the collection, but
in "Beyond the Confinement of Gender: Locating the Space of Legal
Existence for Racialized Women,"32 St. Lewis adds valuably to the earlier
discussions by illustrating the complexity of the race issues that emerge in
feminist analyses of pornography considered in Butler and of sex equality
rights in prison considered in Weatherall v. Canada (A. G.). 3 Her article is
directed at "the question of why feminist legal theorists and activists must
apply the expertise and perspectives of racialized women in the arguments
they make before the courts"34 and argues that "racialized women provide
an opportunity for a revisioning of feminist legal strategies., 35 As such, it
covers familiar terrain in feminist theory, including legal theory, and would
be most engaging to readers relatively new to critical race feminism,
especially within Canada. In this respect, St. Lewis offers a rich overview of
systemic racism in Canadian law and its interaction with conventional
gender issues.
Despite one's familiarity with feminism, however, all readers would
benefit from a reduction of the overlap in content between the articles
alluded to above. Even readers new to feminist debates regarding
essentialism and LEAF's earlier complicity in gender essentialism might find
the repeated explanations of this problem and LEAF's exhibition of it
unnecessary. The cogency of Jhappan's introduction and McIntyre's article
would increase if the overlap in their articulations of feminist responses to
the Left's traditional position that any engagement with the law legitimates
legal liberalism were reduced. Similarly, a large part of Phillips' discussion
of the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, a government
initiative established in 1991 following the aftermath of the Montreal
Massacre, parallels McIntyre's earlier discussion. Further, Stasiulis and
Bakan's piece might have read better had it appeared after St. Lewis'
article, which assumes the grander theoretical scope of revealing systemic
31 It is a credit to the editor that omissions from the text, which would further diversify the range
of women's experiences discussed, are candidly acknowledged and explained at the outset. See Jhappan,
"Introduction" supra note 4 at 23-28.
32 Joanne St. Lewis, "Beyond the Confinement of Gender: Locating the Space of Legal Existence
for Racialized Women" in Jhappan, supra note 1, 295.
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
34 Supra note 32 at 296.
35 Ibid. at 298.
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racism and the importance of racialized perspectives on law for feminist
strategy. The latter would work well before the heavily detailed piece by
Stasiulis and Bakan, which takes up one specific area of systemic
racism-the LIP.
Overall, the collection covers its ambitious scope relatively well.
Like most feminist texts, however, just what counts as feminist advocacy is
not explicitly discussed in the collection. It would, however, appear to be a
preliminary question to be addressed before deciding whether a particular
advocacy project is successful. This would entail setting out what feminist
litigation means. Most articles explicitly argue that at the very least feminist
means an intersectional approach. But none of the articles delve into detail
about whether an organization like LEAF should support litigation that
would ameliorate the positions of some women at the expense of others.
The Symes36 case, in which Beth Symes, a lawyer, claimed that the
Income Tax Act37 infringed her Charter right to equality because she could
not deduct as a business expense the child care expense of hiring a nanny,
presents this dilemma clearly. Although two articles criticize the classist and
racialized dimensions of this case, neither indicate whether they believe
that the case was a feminist one given that had the Court agreed with
Symes, privileged women like her would have benefited at the expense of
less privileged women such as her nanny whom, as one contributor to the
collection states, Symes sought to commodify as a "tax write-off."38 Does a
commitment to intersectionality require feminists to support only those
cases that benefit some or all women without harming any women? Or may
it tolerate more of a utilitarian calculus? Is the first standard of "harming
no women" utopian? If so, and we are thus willing to tolerate benefitting
some women at the expense of other women (or even non-elite men), by
what criteria are we to assess whether a case or goal is worthy of the label
"feminist"? Does everything count as feminist as long as multiple and
competing viewpoints are advanced to the court? How is LEAF to proceed
in cases of sustained and deep feminist conflict as in Butler or elsewhere?
These are no doubt difficult questions and the collection can hardly be
faulted for neglecting them when feminist theorizing in general has not
taken them up. Rather, I include them here as suggestions for future
research in this area.
In short, Women's Legal Strategies is engaging and, despite its
datedness in parts, instructive. Given its ambitious scope, readers will find
36 Symes v. Canada (1993), 1993 4 S.C.R. 695.
37 R.S.C. 1985, (5th Supp.), c. 1.
38 Supra note 32 at 310.
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different aspects of the text useful depending upon their expertise with
feminist theories, Charterjurisprudence, and legal discourse in general. Yet,
the collection's readable style, varied topical content, and discussion of
many leading cases involving equality issues offer opportunities for almost
all individuals to expand their knowledge. It is an excellent choice for
anyone who desires to learn more about how Canadian women have
litigated and lobbied these last twenty years and where we should go from
here.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAND AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS BY GARTH NETTHEIM, GARY D.
MEYERS & DONNA CRAIG (CANBERRA: ABORIGINAL STUDIES
PRESS, 2002)1 489 pages.
BY BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON
2
Indigenous Peoples and Governance Structures is an important,
welcome work, devoted to the complex problem of organizing indigenous
peoples' participation in the governance and management of their
traditional lands and resources. The authors adeptly cover a potpourri of
international experience on this problem, investing the subject with
promise, while a sensible, careful analysis gives it great clarity. The result
is a book as conceptually helpful as it is practically useful. It takes us
beyond the amorphous concepts of aboriginal sovereignty, independence,
autonomy, and self-government that have enjoyed wide currency in recent
literature,3 to the nuanced details of how such concepts are being translated
into workable institutional structures in specific contexts.
What is apparent through this volume is that despite their
enormous diversity-some 300 million members worldwide in more than
70 countries-indigenous peoples face common challenges and recurrent
problems in attempting to move beyond recognition of land rights to the
1[Indigenous Peoples and Governance Structures].
2 Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
3 See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
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